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INDIAN PRIOR AND PARAMOUNT RIGHTS*
VERSUS STATE RIGHTS
WILLIAM H. VEEDER**
I. INTRODUCTION
American Indian history is replete with a shocking pattern of
conflict among the states or those claiming under them and the
Indian Tribes. An overriding aspect of those conflicts with the Indian
people has been the unrelenting avarice of the non-Indian community
for Indian natural resources, including their lands and, in the arid
and semi-arid west, the Indians' invaluable rights to the use of
water.
An accentuating water crisis in the Western States has aggravat-
ed and accelerated the historic practice of seizing Indian rights
for non-Indian projects and purposes. Frequently it is the states,
their laws and their agencies to which the vast industrial cartels
turn for assistance in gaining access or control of the precious
Indian rights to the use of water. Today's upsurge in coal and
oil shale production to meet the alleged "energy crisis" has created
the climate and arena for the final drive to take from the Western
Inidans their rights to the use of water and to exploit them for
industrial and municipal purposes.
This review is directed to a formidable body of jurisprudence
emanating from the Constitution of the United States and the inherent
sovereignty of Indian Tribes and Nations to counter the on-going
plans to take from the Indians their rights to the use of water
in the streams or other sources which arise upon, border, traverse,
or underlie the Western Indian Reservations. Though these comments
are directed to the arid and semi-arid Western States, they pertain
primarily to five of those States. They are North Dakota, South
Dakota, Montana, Idaho and Washington. Their arid and semi-arid
regions have in common many geographical, historical and physical
* Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY MT.
MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 631 (1971).
"** Bureau of Indian Affairs, Washington, D.C., LL.B. 1934, University of Montana.
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features. More important, however, is this fact: Those five States,
in the process of their transition from vast wilderness areas claimed
by foreign Nations, through the common Congressional enactments
creating territorial governments, organic acts, common enabling
acts, or their own Constitutions, are under identical limitations upon
their jurisdiction over Indian lands and rights to the use of water.
By reason of the common historical and legal background, the five
state jurisdictions can reasonably have applied to them the same
concepts of law in connection with the Indian Prior and Paramount
Water Rights versus State Rights.
Pertinent here is the fact that there was published by the North
Dakota Law Review an article entitled "Indian Water Rights In
The Upper Missouri Basin"', The article discussed the nature, extent
and legal characteristics of the Indian Winters Doctrine rights to
the use of water.2 Chronicleld in it are the basic concepts of law
giving rise to, and sustaining, those invaluable property rights of
the Indian Tribes and Nations.
The above referenced article emphasizes the tragic consequences
to the Upper Missouri Basin Indian Tribes and people of the seizure
of Indian water rights without authority by the Interior Department's
Bureau of Reclamation and the United States Army's Corps of Engi-
neers. Those rights include the use of water for non-Indian projects
and purposes. This commentary is a necessary corollary to the earlier
article. It broadens the scope of the inquiry as to the course Ameri-
can Indians and their Trustee, the United States, must pursue if
the Indians are to survive the steady and lawless encroachment
upon their life-sustaining water rights.
II. EASTERN DEVELOPMENT
It is paradoxical that the central governments from Colonial
times to date, while extending their sovereignty over the Indian
people, attempted to ameliorate the consequences of the steady in-
vasion of the ancient homelands of the Indian Nations. Both the
British Crown and the Federal Government developed policies and
entered into treaties with the Indian Tribes and Nations, giving
at least lip service to honorable and fair dealings with them. Great
Britain proclaimed and attempted to enforce a policy which would
protect the Indian Tribes against seizure of their lands. This policy
recognized the rights of the Indians and never coerced them to
sell their lands. When they did sell, it was at a price acceptable
1. Veeder, Indian Water Rights in the Upper Missouri River Basin, 48 N.D. L. REV. 617
(1972).
2. Id. The Winter's Doctrine basically declares that Indians who "reserved to themselves"
a waterway in various treaties between their nation and the U.S. have a prior and paramount
right to the use of that water, State or Federal claims notwithstanding.
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to them. Internal self-government was guaranteed to the Indians
and the treaties Britain entered into were acknowledged as solemn
obligations. That "was the settled state of things when the war
of our revolution was commenced."
In contrast to the mother country's announced policy, the Com-
monwealth of Virginia adopted a hostile approach to the "Indian
problem". This is reflected in a 1623 Act of the Virginia General
Assembly which provided ". . . that at the beginning of July
the inhabitants of every corporation shall fall upon adjoining sal-
vages [sic] as we did last year . . . ." No friendly excursion
against the "salvages" was planned. It is apparent, moreover, that
the Indians could and would fight against the colonists. The General
Assembly Act anticipated that fact. It provided that the colonists
who were "hurte" or "lamed" in the planned attack were to be
maintained at public expense "according to his person and quality.
' ' 4
Before the Revolutionary War, it was thought that a war of
attrition by the local population against the Eastern Indian Tribes
and Nations would reduce many of them to destitution or for practical
purposes result in their annihilation. As Massachusetts and other
colonies prospered, the threat to the Indians increased. The historian
Bancroft described the consequences of the growing Colonies upon
the "red men": The seizure of Indian land, the Indians' desperate
struggle to survive and the inevitable consequences of the conflict.5
A brief respite occurred for the Eastern Indian Tribes during
the Colonial War for Independence. Among the rebelling Colonies
there was extreme apprehension that the Indian Tribes would add
their arms to Britain." As a consequence the then aborning States,
under the Articles of Confederation, far from advancing a claim
to Indian land or asserting dominion over the Indians, resolved
to foster and preserve Indian friendship. Desire of the thirteen origi-
nal States to maintain peace with the remaining powerful Indian
Nations is exemplified by the September 17, 1778, Treaty between
the Confederated' States and the Delaware Indian Nation.7 Reflec-
tive of the temper of the Revolutionary times, the Indian Nations
and the Confederated States, acting through the Congress, negotiated
with the Delawares on the basis of "equality." 8
When success against the British Empire was achieved, the
fragile Confederation of thirteen separate sovereign States had no
desire for further conflict with the Eastern Indian Tribes and Nations.
3. Worcester v. Georgia, S1 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 549 (1932). See Chief Justice Marshall's
review of British Indian policy in this hallmark decision at 559-97.
4. Henning's Statutes at Large 128 (1619-1660).
5. 1 BANCROFT, BANCROFT's HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 451 (Cent. Ed.).
6. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 549.
7. Treaty with the Delaware Nation, Act of Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13.
8. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 549 (1832).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Hence, treaties of the highest dignity were concluded. Mutuality
among the Confederated States and the Indian Nations was reflected
in those treaties, albeit they adhered to the pretenses of the Crown
by declaring that the Tribes would come within the "protection"
of the United States. Proclaimed in all those treaties was the desire
for everlasting peace and friendship among the Confederated States
and the Indian Nations.
It is vital to this review that there be kept in the foreground
an underlying historical fact which has profound effect upon the
Federal-Indian and State relationships: Prior to, during, and after
the Revolutionary War, both the British and the Continental Con-
gress recognized that the Indian Tribes were political communities
of "national character" having the "inherent" powers of "self-gov-
ernment."O
Failure of the Articles of Confederation respecting Indians and
Indian Tribes was a prime example of the overall inadequacies
of the Confederation. Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, in their Federalist
essays, expressed the imperative need to have Indian affairs conduct-
ed pursuant to the Constitution within the plenary jurisdiction of
the Central Government they were proposing." It was readily recog-
nized that the States were unwilling or unable to restrain the ag-
gressions of their citizens against the Indians with the attendant
frequent and often dreadful wars."' Moreover, the Indian Nations
on the borders were a threat to the Union as possible allies of
European powers.12
It was in the contemplation of those facts as reflected in part
by the Federalist, that the Constitution of the United States, 1787,
provides: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes. . . ."Is Full power over Indian affairs
is thus the province of Congress. It is elemental that the Constitution,
the laws, and all treaties, "[S]hall be the supreme Law of the
Land. . . .14 Treaty-making resides with the President, acting
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate. . . provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur. . . "'15 Pursuant to
that supreme authority the National Government was to enter into
between 370 and 400 Indian treaties. 6
It is important that the Constitution was initially applied to
Indian affairs by Justices in the formative years who were states-
9. Id. at 560.
10. T FDMERALIST, (J. Hamilton ed. 1885) (A. Hamilton, J. Jay, & J. Madison).
11. THE FEDERALIST, No. 3, at 63 (J. Hamilton ed. 1885) (J. Jay).
12. THE FEDERALIST, No. 25, at 207 (J. Hamilton ed. 1885) (A. Hamilton).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
14. Id. at art. VI.
15. Id. at art. II, § 2.
16. 119 CONG. REC. S. 8833-34 (daily ed. March 6, 197.) iremarks of Senator Mansfield).
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men at the time of its adoption. Respecting Indian treaties, those
Justices declared, "The words 'treaty' and 'nation', are words
of our own language . . . having each a definite and well-understood
meaning. We have applied them to Indians and, as we have applied
them to other nation's of the earth; they are applied to all in the
same sense.
'17
Elemental precepts for the construction to be placed upon the
Constitution declare that contemporaneous writings are to be ascribed
substantial weight."' Chief Justice Marshall applied the explicit pow-
ers and those necessarily implied from the Constitution itself. When
speaking for the Supreme Court he laid the predicate for the formid-
able body of law so favorable to the Indian Tribes and people.
He turned to the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, and
to this Nation's treaty-making powers in establishing the safeguards
within the purview of the Constitution which would guarantee to
the Indian people basic rights which have been ignored in many
instances and intentionally violated in others. In addition to those
provisions of the Constitution cited above, there was reliance upon
those provisions of the Constitution which formulated Federal-State
relations.19 A key proviso of Federal-State relations declares that
"[n]ew States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.
" . .- 20 A companion provision is the so-called Property Clause
which states that "[t]he Congress shall have Power to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terri-
tory or other Property belonging to the United States .. ."21
It was on the initial application of all of those Constitutional
provisions that the Congress adopted the "Ordinance of 1787; The
Northwest Territorial Government. ' 22 Contained in that North-
west Ordinance are the putative elements of a national policy to
protect the Indians from their frequently lawless non-Indian neigh-
bors. It was originally passed by The Confederated Congress July
13, 1787, to provide for the government of the Territory northwest
of the Ohio River which had been ceded to the thirteen original
States by Great Britain at the conclusion of the Revolutionary War,
and in turn conveyed by them to the New Central Government.
23
From that once wilderness area occupied by powerful Indian Nations
there would be carved the States of Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan
and Wisconsin.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance, the Con-
gress declared:
17. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832).
18. Of. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (14 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819).
19. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
20. U.S. CONST. art. V, § 3.
21. Id.
22. Act of August 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, n.(a).
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The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the
Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from
them without their consent; and in their property, rights and
liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless injust and lawful wars authorized by Congress; .... 24
History sustains a view that the language, though honorable in
context, was meaningless in application because there were no means
of enforcement.
Kent in his commentaries which were contemporaneous with
the rapid annihilation of many Indian Tribes in the then "northwest-
ern part" of the United States, refers to the fact that the non-Indian
population surrounding Indian lands were "[P]enetrated with a
perfect contempt of Indian rights. 125 That "perfect contempt" for
Indian rights by the States, those claiming under them, and their
inhabitants, is but an ordinary example of this Nation's history
irrespective of its expressed wishes and desires to the contrary.
The most fearful example of that "perfect contempt" of Indian
rights by white men were the enactments of the legislature of the
State of Georgia as they related to the Cherokee Nation. By a Treaty
between the United States and the Cherokees the latter were granted
their inherent sovereign powers of self-government and the Indian
lands encompassed within the territorial integrity guaranteed by
the Treaty. Georgia, by its laws, violated both features of the Cher-
okee Treaty. Prusuant to them it undertook to destroy the Cherokees
and to challenge this Nation's power, authority, and integrity. 2
Georgia's aggression against the Indian Nation and the United
States of America gave rise to Supreme Court decisions of trans-
cendent importance. It likewise precipitated the present National
policy respecting Indian Tribes and States. Chief Justice Marshall,
speaking for the Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 2 enunciated
the constitutional concept of a fiduciary obligation by the United
States to the Indian Tribes, beneficiaries of the trust. Marshall
declared the United States' relation with the Indians "resembles
that of guardian and ward. ' 2
The same great Chief Justice who proclaimed the Trust obli-
gations of the Nation to the Indian people in the Cherokee Nation
Decision, spoke for the Court in Worcester v. Georgia,2 9 rendered
the following year. Marshall said, "The treaties and laws of the
23. 1 KENT's COMMENTARIES 286, (13th ed. 1884); 1 SToRy, ON TEE CONSTITUTION 16
(6th ed. 1891).
24. Act of August 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, n.(a), art. B.
25. 3 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 558 (18 ed. 1884).
26. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) ; Worcester v. Georgia, 81
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
27. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
28. Id. at 12.
29. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely sepa-
rated from that of the states;. and provide that all intercourse with
them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the
Union."30 Having analyzed the laws of the State of Georgia, the
Supreme Court determined them to be a clear invasion of the Con-
stitutionally guaranteed property and jurisdiction of the Cherokee
Nation. In these unequivocal terms this Nation's Constitution was
applied to Georgia's conduct against the Cherokees: "[T]he acts
of Georgia are repugnant to the constitution, laws and treaties of
the United States. They interfere forcibly with the relations estab-
lished between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regu-
lation of which, according to the settled principles of our constitu-
tion, are committee exclusively to the government of the Union.""1
Accordingly, the laws of Georgia which violated the jurisdiction
and rights of the Cherokee Indian Nation were declared void and
a judgment of a Georgia court based upon them, a nullity.
The main thrust of this consideration is the Constitutional im-
munity of Indian lands and Indian Winters Doctrine rights to the
use of water from seizure, invasion, or violation by the States or
those claiming under them, and the imperative need to enforce
that immunity. It is, of course, an elemental proposition of law
that the Indian Winters Doctrine rights are part and parcel of
the Indian lands themselves. Those Indian Winters Doctrine rights
are neither acquired by use nor are they lost by disuse.3 2 Equally
elemental is this proposition of the law: The alleged modification
of the Worcester Decision, with its emphatic declaration of the
absolute, exclusive, and plenary Federal power over Indian affairs
vis-a-vis the States, does not in any sense involve Indian lands
or water rights. 3 Further, it is essential to underscore the inter-
related tenets of law enunciated, in Cherokee Nation and Worcester,
which both recognize that the Indian Tribes and Nations are distinct,
independent, political communities within the purview of the National
Constitution. They are possessed with a "[P]re-existing power
of the nation to govern itself. '34
Respecting that sovereign power which is part of the ancient
Indian heritage, the U.S. Supreme Court said: "It must always
be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent
and sovereign nations, and. that their claim to sovereignty long
predates: that of our' own Government. 3 5 Recently, the Supreme
30. Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 561.
32. Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use of Water, 16 .ROCKY MT.
MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 631 (1971).
33. Of. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm., 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
34. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561-62 (1832).
35. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
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Court in Mancari v. Morton declared: "The plenary power of con-
gress to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both
explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself.""
Irrespective of the application to the Indian Tribes and people
of the Constitutional concept of basic law and human dignity, through
the Cherokee and Worcester Decisions, there were parallel forces
which would have cataclysmic effect upon them. Kent, in an over-
statement, points out that it had been shown to his satisfaction
that the intentions of the Government of the United Sates in the
treatment of the Indians had been uniformly just and benevolent.
This, Kent states, was the case down to the year 1829.37 That change
in 1829 was under the Administration of President Jackson. It was
at that time the harsh and brutal "Removal Acts" were passed."8
In The House Divides" it is related that President Jackson
was confronted by the desires of the States of Georgia and Mississippi
to confiscate the Indian lands. Reasons in 1830 and 1974 for violation
of Indian basic rights and properties are identical. It is succinctly
stated in these terms: "[Land] speculators thought in terms of
• . . hundreds of thousands of acres, obtained from government
grants, and for sale and resale. ' °4 0 But "where was the land to
come from? " "At the expense of the Indians, of course, ... ex-
pulsion of the red men by the whites."4 1
III. WESTERN DEVELOPMENT & STATEHOOD
Emerging from this Nation's trauma stemming from the devas-
tation of removing the Cherokees and others from their immemorial
eastern homelands to west of the Mississippi, was a renewal of
Federal conscience. Treaty guarantees to the Indians which were
so grossly violated, have been buttressed by placing absolute juris-
diction over Indian lands in the Federal Government, as conditions
precedent to the admission of new States into the Union. Constitu-
tional power to thus condition State admissions stems from the
above quoted Congressional power to authorize new States and to
control the Nation's property.42
Every phase of this Nation's relationship with the Indian Tribes
and Nations within the States of North Dakota, South Dakota, Mon-
tana, Idaho, and Washington relates to the accession of the lands
constituting them, the administration of those lands, and the creation
of those States. When in 1803 the Louisiana Purchase was consum-
36. Morton v. Mancari, 94 S. Ct. 247'4 (1974). .
87. 3 KEN's COMMENTARins 557 n.(b) (13th ed. 1884).
38. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 ; Act of July 14, 1882, cI. 228, 4 Stat. 594.
39. P. WELLmAN, THE I-IOuSE DIVIDES.
40. Id. at 29.
41. Id.
42. Bee U.S. CONOT. art. IV, J 3.
PRIOR AND PARAMOUNT WATER RIGHTS
mated with France, most of the lands constituting the present State
of Montana to the crest of the Rocky Mountains, and the States
of North and South Dakota became part of the Union. The Louisiana
Purchase is justly regarded as one of the most important events
in American history. It had far-reaching import in the development
of the Indian policy of the United States. Not only did the newly
acquired empire constitute the ultimate abode of Eastern Indians
who had been forced to leave their ancient hqmelands, but also
it afforded an opportunity to the Congress in admitting new States
to be carved from the area, to prescribe explicit conditions for
the admittance of those Sates which would protect the Indians and
their properties. It is significant that in establishing the temporary
government for the newly acquired Louisiana lands4 3 The Act of
18024 that gave Constitutional sanction and protection to the inherent
rights of Indian Tribes to exercise the powers of self-government,
was made applicable to numerous Indian Tribes and Nations then
occupying the millions of square miles of the Missouri River Drain-
age. Part of that Congressional policy was to foster trade with the
Indians and to preserve the peace with them.45
Virtually a half century after the Louisiana Purchase there would
be another gigantic acquisition by the National Government-the
Oregon Territory. That came about in 1846, through the Treaty
with Great Britain "In Regard To Limits Westward Of The Rockey
Mountains. ' '46 International politics and economic pressures involv-
ing Great Britain and Russia would prompt the United States to
move far more rapidly in establishing territorial governments than
it did in the Upper Missouri River Basin. Accordingly, in the exercise
of its powers under the Property Clause of the Constitution, the
Congress in 1848 passed "An Act to establish the Territorial Govern-
ment of Oregon. '4
Respecting the Indians occupying the land, Congress declared:
[N]othing in this act contained shall be construed to impair
the rights of person or property now pertaining to the Indians
in said Territory ... or to affect the authority of the govern-
ment of the United States to make any regulation respecting
such Indians, their lands, property, or other rights. *8
It is noteworthy that the Act establishing the Government for the
Oregon Territory made applicable to that Territory the Ordinance
of 1787 which governed the then Northwest Territory. In that 1787
43. Act of March 26, 1804, ch. 38, § 15, 2 Stat. 283.
44. Act of March 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139.
45. See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 136.
46. Treaty with Great Britain, June 15, 1846, 9 Stat. 869.
47. Act of August 14, 1848, ch. 177, 9 Stat. 323.
48. Id.
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Ordinance Congress provided that, "The utmost good faith shall
always be observed towards the Indians; their land and property shall
never be taken from them without their consent; * * *"49 When
on March 2, 1853, the Congress passed "An Act to establish the
Territorial Government of Washington" 50 it used identical provisions
as those quoted from the Oregon Territorial provision. Congress
thus retained its Constitutional power over Indian affairs and Indian
property within the Territory of Washington.
On March 2, 1861, eight years 'subsequent to the establishment
of the Territory of Washington, there was created on its eastern
boundary the Territory of Dakota. In keeping with the earlier Terri-
torial Acts for Oregon and later Washington, the United States of
America retained its full and absolute power over the Indian Tribes
and their lands. Moreover, it is declared in the Dakota Territorial
Act that the lands of the Indian Tribes which pertain to Treaties
between the Indian Tribes and the United States, would not be
included "within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State
or territory" without the consent of the Indian Tribe or Tribes.52
In addition the establishment of the Dakota Territory would not,
affect the authority of the government of the United States
to make any regulations respecting such Indians, their lands,
property, or other rights, by treaty, law, or otherwise, which
it would have been competent for the government to make
if this act had never passed.. .. 53
Manifestly, the National Government had learned from the cata-
strophic 'lessons alluded to above, the need to protect and defend
the Indian Tribes and properties from violation by the surrounding
non-Indian populations.
On March 3, 1863, two years subsequent to the creation of Dakota,
the Congress established the Territory of Idaho.54 Using virtually
identical language to that used, respecting Dakota, the Congress
proscribed violations of the rights of the Indian Tribes, their lands
and properties, within the Idaho Territory.55
On May 26, 1864, three years after the Congressional action
on the Dakota Territory, authority for the temporary government
49. Act of August 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, n.(a), art. III.
50. Act of March 2, 1853, ch. 90, 10 Stat. 172.
51. Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 86, 12 Stat. 239. This "Organic Law" Is reproduced In vol.
13 of the N.D. CENT. CoDE at 77 (1960), and in vol. 1 of the S.D. COMPtLED LAwS ANN.
at 173 (1967).
52. Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 86, 12 Stat. 239.
53. Id.
54. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 117, 12 Stat. 808 (reprinted in vol. 1 at 28 of the IDAHO
CODE).
55. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 117, § 1, 12 Stat. 808.
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of the Montana Territory was granted.5 6 It contained the-provisions
for the immunity of Indian lands from territorial interference, and
the exclusive and plenary power of Congress over those Indian
lands.
Additional safeguards respecting Indian rights and interests were
contained in the organic acts establishing the Territories of Idaho
and Montana. For example, they specifically provide in Idaho and
Montana that:
[a]ll treaties, laws, and other engagements made by the
government of the United States with the Indian tribes in-
habiting the territory embraced within the provisions of this
act, shall be faithfully and rigidly observed, anything con-
tained in this act to the contrary notwithstanding; . . .
Progressive implementation of the Trust relationship and the
means of enforcing it by the Congress of the United States and
the Indian Tribes and people is shown by the language of the Enabling
Act passed February 22, 1889, pursuant to which the inhabitants
of the Territories of Dakota, Montana and Washington "may become
the States of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington,
respectively ...... "58 Congress then in the exercise of its powers
to admit States to the Union in fulfillment of its obligation as Trustee
for Indian Tribes and people, and to establish needful rules and
regulations of the Indian lands prescribed these conditions in the
Enabling Act respecting the last mentioned States:
That the people inhabiting said proposed States do agree and-
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title . . . to
all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian
or Indian tribes .... 59
Moreover, Congress provided additional conditions to the admittance
of these states to the Union by declaring:
[until] the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the
United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the
disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Con-
gress of the United States. .... 0
56. Act of May 26, 1864, ch. 95, 13 Stat. 85 (reprinted in vol. 1 of the MONT. REzV. CODES
ANN. at 57).
57. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 117, § 17, 12 Stat. 808 (reprinted in vol. 1 of the IDAHO
CODE at 36). Act of May 26, 1864, ch. 95, § 17, 13 Stat. 85 (reproduced in vol. 1 of the
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. at 64).
58. Act of February 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 1, 25 Stat. 676.
59. Id. § 4(2) (emphasis added).
60. Act of February 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4(2), 25 Stat. 676 (emphasis added) (reproduced
in vol. 13 of the N.D. CENr. CODz at 87; vol. 1 of the S.D. CoMPILED LAWS ANN. at 183,
and vol. 1 of the MONT. Rzv. CODES ANN. at 67).
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As noted above, the State of Idaho was first established as
a Territory under a Congressional Act which pre-dated the States
of North Dakota, South Dakota and Montana. Congress did not pass
an Enabling Act as it did for the other four States here under
consideration. Rather, it passed on July 3, 1890, as denominated
by the statutes of the State of Idaho, the "Idaho Admission Bill." 61
In the "Idaho Admission Bill" Congress stated that "[t]he con-
stitution which the people of Idaho have formed for themselves
be, and the same is hereby, accepted, ratified, and confirmed." 62
Contained in the Idaho Constitution is this provision:
And the people of the state of Idaho do agree and declare
that we forever disclaim all right and title . . . within the
boundaries thereof . . . to all lands lying within said limits
owned or held by any Indians or Indian Tribes .... Moreover,
the Constitution of the State of Idaho provides that until the
Congress has extinguished the title to Indian lands they "....
shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the
congress of the United States. .... 3
On October 1, 1889, language identical to the above was set
forth in the Constitution of North Dakota. It is referred to as that
State's "Compact With the United States. ' 64 Included in the Compact
is the declaration by the inhabitants of North Dakota that the im-
munity of lands of Indians and Indian Tribes guaranteed by *
"shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and
the people of this state ... "65
Following a similar pattern the people of South Dakota adopted
the Constitution of South Dakota on October 1, 1889. Also by a
"Compact With The United States" the people of South Dakota
in the Constitution forever disclaimed all right and title to the
'lands of Indians and Indian Tribes and declare that absolute juris-
diction and control of Indian lands shall remain in the Congress
of the United States. 66
In Ordinance No. 1 under the heading of "Federal Relations,"
which was made part of the Constitution of Montana, is the state-
ment: "Be it Ordained, . . . [that] the people inhabiting the
said proposed state of Montana [like North Dakota, South Dakota,
and later Idaho] . . . [f] orever disclaim all right and title to
. . . lands . . . owned or held by any Indian and Indian Tribes...",
acknowledging, as did the other states, that those Indian lands...
61. Act of July 8, 1890, ch. 656, 26 Stat. 215 (reprinted In vol. 1 of the IDAHO CODE at 37).
62. Act of July 3, 1890, ch. 656, § 1, 26 Stat. 215.
63. IDAHO CONST. art. 21, § 19 (emphasis added).
64. N.D. CONST. art. 16.
65. Id. § 208(2).
66. S.D. (ONST. art. 22.
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[s]hall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the
Congress of the United States ... "61
The vitality of the 1864 Territorial Act, the Enabling Act, and
the State's original Constitution which provided ample protection
to the Indians and their lands, was reasserted. 8 That vitality is
stated in explicit terms by Montana's "Compact With The United
States" which declares that:
All provisions of the enabling act of Congress (approved Feb-
ruary 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676), as amended and of Ordinance
No. 1, appended to the Constitution of the state of Montana
and approved February 22, 1889, including the agreement and
declaration that all lands owned or held by any Indian or
Indian tribes shall remain under the absolute jurisdication
and control of the congress of the United States, continue in
full force and effect until revoked by the consent of the
United States and the people of Montana. 69
As observed earlier, the Territory of Washington was created
by Congress on March 2, 1853.70 It was nevertheless admitted into
the Union pursuant to the same enabling Act as North and South
Dakota and Montana. Identical with those last named States is
the "Compact With The United States" contained in the Constitution
of the State of Washington.71 There is thus a total unanimity in
the conditions precedent to the admission of those States into the
Union. Lands of Indians and Indian Tribes are immune from State
jurisdiction. There is absolute jurisdiction and control over those
Indian lands residing in the Congress of the United States.
Transcendent importance must be ascribed to the Supremacy
provision of this Nation's Constitution.7 2 Underscoring the immut-
ability of the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of
the United States over the lands of Indians and Indian Tribes and
the States of North and South Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and Wash-
ington, is the additional proviso of the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, that Judges in every state are by the National laws
and treaties, notwithstanding any state law to the contrary. It
is beyond question that the Enabling Acts passed by Congress pro-
viding for the admission of those States into the Union, effectively
retained in the exclusive and plenary power over the Indians, Indian
Tribes and their properties. In a vast variety of Supreme Court
decisions involving Indians, Indian Tribes and their lands, this
67. MONT. CONST. Ord. 1, second.
68. Act of May 26, 1864, ch. 95, 13 Stat. 85.
69. MONT. CONST. art. 1 (1972).
70. Act of March 2, 1853, ch. VO, 10 Stat. 172.
71. WASH. CONST. art. 26.
72. U.S. COdNST. art. VI.
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rule of law has been recognized. In Sandoval v. United States,78
involving the Pueblo Indians of New. Mexico, the. Supreme Court
reiterated the Constitutional precept that the power respecting Indian
affairs resides in the Congress and declared "[T] hat body is neces-
sarily supreme in its exercise. ' 74
Recently in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission the
Supreme Court denied the power of Arizona to tax the income
of the Navajo Indians residing on the Navajo Reservation. The
decision alluded to the power of Congress to condition the admission
of States into -the Union, stating that, "when Arizona entered into
the Union, its entry was conditioned on the proviso that the State"
disclaim all right and title to lands of Indians or Indian Tribes
and that until the United States extinguishes the title to those lands,
they would remain subject to the "absolute jurisdiction and control
of the Congress of the United States." 76 Reference was also made
to the fact that the admission into the Union of both New Mexico
and Utah was similarly conditioned.7 7
Thus, immunity of Indian lands from State control throughout
the arid and semi-arid regions of the United States has been and
is now the law. That circumstance prevails not only by reason
of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution as it is related to
Trust responsibility among the United States, the Indians and Indian
Tribes, but also due to the acceptance by the States of the conditions
respecting the protection of Indians and their lands by the will
of Congress.
In the exercise of this supreme authority the United States
entered into numerous covenants of the highest dignity with Indians
in the States of North Dakota, South Dakota, 78 Montana, Idaho
and Washington. Pursuant to those Treaties, Indian Reservations
were established. Other Indian Reservations were created by Execu-
tive Orders. Titles of the Indians occupying Executive Order Reser-
vations have been ratified, approved and recognized by Congress.
Respecting Executive Order Indian Reservations, it has been authori-
tatively declared in regard to the Spokane Indian Reservation, an
Executive Order Reservation 'in the State of Washington: "There
can be no doubt that such a reservation by proclamation of the
executive stands upon the same plane as a reservation made by
treaty or by act of Congress."7 9
73. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
74. Id. at 47.
75. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
76. Id. at 175.
77. Id. at 175 n.14.
78. Significance must be ascribed to the fact that in the current Compiled Laws of South
Dakota, in the volume designated "Constitutions and Historical Documents" there is set
forth a list of eighteen (18) Treaties with the Sioux Tribes and others, the first of which
is dated July 16, 1825. See vol. 1 of the S.D. COMPILD LAWS ANN. at 55.
79. Gibson v. Anderson, 131 F. 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1904).
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Relative to the Colvile Indian Reservation, an Executive Order
Reservation also in the State of Washington, the Attorney General
of the United States noted:
The effect of that executive order [creating in 1872 the Col-
ville Indian Reservation] was the same as would have been
a treaty with the Indians for the same purpose, and was to
.exclude all intrusion upon the territory thus reserved by any
and every person, other than the Indians for whose benefit
the reservation was made, for mining as well as other pur-
poses.80
The great dignity of the Federal-Indian relationship under the
Supremacy clause is frequently ignored. It is to that aspect of
the law that the remainder of this review is directed, with specia .
reference to the States and those claiming under them.
IV. INDIAN TREATY RIGHTS
Indian Tribes in the Upper Missouri River Basin were fierce,
warlike, and willing to defend their homelands against the intruding
non-Indian population. That fact forced the United States to invoke
the most basic power of a sovereign-to wage war and to effectuate
peace by Treaties resolving the differences between nations. Those
elemental factors gave rise to the September 17, 1851, Treaty of
Fort Laramie with Sioux and other Tribes. 81 That Treaty allocated
specific territories to the various Indian nations within the vast
area of the Upper Missouri River Basin, including substantial portions
of the present States of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana,
Wyoming, and the Missouri drainage system in the present state
of Colorado.
In considering the question of Indian Winters Doctrine rights
in the Upper Basin of the Missouri River, it is of interest that
in the year 1851, when the Sioux entered into their Treaty with
the United States, the field of western water law was in its inceptive
stages. It was the California gold rush in 1850 and 1851 that gave
impetus to the development of that field of law with all of, its
complexities, including the phase of it which relates to Indian Win-
ters Doctrine rights.
Of particular interest here is the vast internal empire occupied
by the Arikara, Gros Ventre, and Mandans which extended from
the Heart River in the present State of North Dakota, up the Missouri
C
80. 34 Op. ATr'r Gsn. 171, 178 (1923-25), citing McFadden v. Mountain View Min. &
Mill. Co., 97 F. 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1899).
81. 2 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFAiRS--LAWS AND TREATIES § 94:(1904). The nations which as-
sembled for the purpose of establishing peaceful relations among themselves were the Sioux,
Cheyenne, Arrapaho, Crow, Assinaboln, Gros-Ventre, Mandan and Arikara.
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to the north of the Yellowstone River, thence up the Yellowstone
in Montana to the mouth of the Power, thence in a southwesterly
direction to the headwaters of the Little Missouri in Montana, thence
along the range of mountains known as the Black Hills to the
head waters of the Heart River; down that river to the place of
beginning. In 1851, as now, the natural streams carried the life
blood of the Indian Tribes and Nations. Of importance here is
City of New Town, North Dakota v. United States82 which denied
claims of jurisdiction, based upon the laws of the State of North
Dakota, over the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.
Four years after the 1851 Treaty between the United States
und the Sioux Nations, yet a quarter century antecedent to the
admission of the State of Washington into the Union, the National
Government entered into the "Treaty between the United States
and the Yakima Nation of Indians." ' 3 Few documents in the history
of the Western United States have had a more profound effect
upon the Federal-Indian Tribes-State relationship. By that Treaty
there was carved from the vast and ancient homelands of the Yaki-
mas the present Yakima Indian Reservation. The history of that
Indian Nation has been marked by its courageous efforts to protect
and maintain its magnificent Treaty rights to the use of water,
its Treaty rights of fishery and the land base upon which its very
existence is dependent.
A half century after the Yakima Treaty was entered into, its
immense value to the Indians was established in United States v.
Winans.84 The case arose by reason of treaty violations by both
the Interior Department and the State of Washington. Pursuant
to that document, the Yakimas had reserved-not granted-the right
to fish for salmon on the Columbia River in their "usual and ac-
customed places."8' 5 Of importance is the fact that those "usual
and accustomed" Indian fishing places were far removed from the
Yakima Indian Reservation. In disregard of those Treaty rights
the Secretary of the Interior issued patents to non-Indians to the
lands along the Columbia River, which included the fishing sites.
Reservations of the Indian rights of fishery were not included in
the patents. Moreover, the State of Washington, claiming jurisdic-
tion over the Columbia River salmon runs and the bed of that
navigable river, licensed to non-Indians the right to maintain a
fishing wheel, the operation of which excluded the Yakimas from
their ancient fishing grounds. Issue was joined in this manner:
Did the Yakima Treaty supersede both the Federal patent to the
82. 454 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1972).
83. 12 Stat. 951 (ratified March 8, 1859).
84. 198 U.S. 871 (1905).
85. 12 Stat. 951, 953 (nitified March 8, 1859).
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land and the license granted by the State of Washington? Yes,
said the Highest Court, and from that Winans Decision would flow
the basic concepts of the Indian Winters Doctrine establishing the
prior and paramount rights of the Indians over junior state-created
rights.
As to the Treaty fishing rights superseding subsequent. Federal
patents and the State license, the Supreme Court ruled that "they
imposed a servitude upon every piece of land as though described
therein."8 6 The Court further declared that the treaty rights were
"[I]ntended to be continuing against the United States and its
grantees as well as against the State and its grantees.18 7 Specifi-
cally, to the State of Washington which had issued the fishing license
that violated the Yakima Treaty rights: "[I]t was within the
competency of the Nation to secure to the Indians such a remnant
of the great rights they possessed as 'taking fish at all usual and
accustomed places.' "88 In reference to the State fishing wheel li-
cense, the exercise of which excluded the Yakimas from enjoying
their Treaty rights, the Court said that the Indian fishing rights
were "easements" in the lands. The license did not supersede those
Indian fishing easements and the State license did not limit or
determine those rights. 8
In a controversy over the ownership of tidelands adjacent to
their Reservation, the Lummi Tribe relied upon its Treaty of January
22, 1855, with the United States. It was asserted that the defendant
held title from the State of Washington. Quoting Winans, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declared that by their Treaty the
Lummis reserved all of the rights already possessed by them and
not granted away, including the tidelands in question.90 The decision
emphasized that by the Enabling Act admitting the State of Wash-
ington into the Union, the people of the State agreed to "forever
disclaim all right and title" to Indian lands, and that "said Indian
lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of
the Congress of the United States."9' 1
Contemporaneously, but far to the east of the Yakima Nation,
there was executed the "Treaty with the Blackfoot Indians." 92 That
Treaty encompassed a vast area of the Upper Missouri River Basin
west of the lands embraced in the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie
with the Sioux and other Tribes, to which reference is made above.
Not only did it include lands in the Missouri Basin -east of the
86. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
87. Id. at 381-82.
88. Id. at 384.
89. Id.
90. United States v. Romaine, 255 F. 253, 260 (9th Cir. 1919).
91. Id.
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Rocky Mountains, but likewise west of those Mountains in the then
Territory of Washington.
The historical facts of Indian prior and paramount rights are
reviewed in some detail in Winters v. United States rendered by
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 93 In 1874 Congress was
to reduce the area embraced within the original Treaty with the
Blackfoot to include the lands north of the Missouri between the
Western Boundary of the Dakota Territory discussed above, and
the Rocky Mountains. 94 Subsequently by an Agreement dated May
1, 1888, and ratified by Congress, the Indians again agreed to reduce
the areas of their Reservations creating, among others, the Fort
Belknap Reservation. The next year Montana was admitted into
the Union. Winters, who was diverting water from the Milk River
above the Reservation, claimed, as against the Fort Belknap Indians,
that the laws of appropriation superseded the Agreement of May
1, 1888, pursuant to which the Indians claimed their rights to the
use of water, although the Treaty of 1855 or the subsequent Agree-
ment of 1888 made no mention of rights to the use of water in
that stream. Issue was thus joined as to whether Montana's admis-
sion into the Union would vitiate the claimed rights of the Indians
in the Milk River which bordered the Fort Belknap Indian Reser-
vation.
In rejecting the assertion that State laws could thus violate
Indian rights to the use of water, the Court of Appeals in Winters
quoted extensively from United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Ir-
rigation Co. 95 That decision, rendered by the Supreme Court, in-
volved the power of States to adopt laws respecting the appropriation
of rights to the use of waters within their respective jurisdictions.
Conceding that the State could adopt the doctrine of prior appropri-
ation and reject the common law doctrine of riparian rights, the
Supreme Court declared nevertheless that each State must recognize
two 'limitations.
First, that in the absence of specific authority from Congress
a State cannot by its legislation destroy the rights of the
United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream,
to the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as may
be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government prop-
erty. Second, that it is limited by the superior power of the
-general government to secure the uninterrupted navigability
of all navigable streams within the limits of the United
States.96
92, 11 Stat. 657.
93. Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1906).
94. Act of April 15, 1874, ch. 96, 18 Stat. 28.
95. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
96. Id. at 703.
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In adopting that principle of law as applicable to the superior
rights to the use of water of the Fort Belknap Indians over claimants
under the laws of Montana, the Ninth Circuit added that "[t]he
right so reserved [by the Indians] continues to exist against the
United States and its grantees, as well as against the state and
its grantees." 97 It is noteworthy that the Court of Appeals used
almost identical language on the precise subject of Indian rights
being Valid against both the National and State governments and
their grantees, as was used in Winans.9 8
In affirming the Winters Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court devoted a substantial portion of its opinion to the
Federal-Indian Tribe-State confrontation which the case presented.
It made particular reference to the previously discussed Enabling
Act pursuant to which the States of Montana, North Dakota, South
Dakota and Washington were admitted to the Union. That Enabling
Act specified that Montana and the other States would be admitted
"upon an equal footing with the original States."9' 9 In denying that
the protection of the Fort Belknap rights to the use of water reserved
by them in their Agrement of May 1, 1888, would violate Montana's
equal footing status, the Supreme Court said: "The power of the
Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropri-
ation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be."' 00
Significantly in support of that explicit ruling the Supreme Court
cited both the Rio Grande Decision and the Winans Decision. Both
Rio Grande and Winans preclude State interference with rights to
the use of water in which there is a Federal interest. In the Winters
Decision the interest 'of the United States was that of Trustee for
the Indians against adverse claimants asserting State rights. In
the words of the Court in Winters: "The government is asserting
the rights of the Indians."''
On July 16, 1855, at Hell Gate in the Bitter Root Valley, a
Treaty between the United States and the Flathead, Kootenay, and
Upper Pend d'Oreilles Indians was concluded-. The Flathead Indian
Reservation was thus established. Almost forty years later Montana
would be admitted to the Union subject to the limitation that Indian
'lands within the limits of the state "shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.' '0 2
Michel Pablo, a Flathead Indian, diverted and applied water
from Mudd Creek upon a tract of Reservation land. Suit was brought
against the United States by Pablo's successors in interest, asserting
97. Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 749 (9th Cir. 1906).
98. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 871, 381-82 (1905).
99. Act of February 22, 1889. ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676.
100. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
101. Id. at 576.
102. MoNT. CONST., Ord. 1, second.
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that plaintiffs succeeded to Pablo's rights to the use of water for
certain land on the basis that the rights were acquired by local
statute or custwm. In rejecting the claimed applicability of State
law to rights to the use of water within the Flathead Indian Reser-
vation, the court emphasized that those rights were reserved to
the Indians by the treaty. Moreover, the court said that the United
States was the Trustee and held the "legal title to the lands and
waters for the benefit of the Indians."' 10 3 As was similarly declared
in the above cited Rio Grande Decision, "Being reserved no title
to the waters could be acquired except as specified by Congress. ' 10 '
Applying that precept of the law, the McIntire Decision declared
that "the Montana statutes regarding water rights are not appli-
cable, because Congress at no time has made such statutes control-
ling in the reservation.' 0 5
In the 1939 McIntire Decision the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recognized that by the Hell Gate Treaty of 1855 the Flathead
Tribes reserved to themselves the Winters Doctrine rights to the
use of water and that rights to the use of water within the Flathead
Indian Reservation were immune from acquisition under State 'law.
Three years later, in Montana Power v. Rochester °6 that same
court had before it the issue of whether the Hell Gate Treaty re-
tained title in the Tribes to the south half of Flathead Lake which
is a navigable body of water. It was urged that, in keeping with
a general rule, title to the beds of navigable waters passed to
the States upon admission to the Union, and that, absent an intention
to the contrary, title would pass from the National Government
to the State of Montana when it joined the Union. In analyzing
the issue of whether the title of the south half of Flathead Lake
resides in the Tribes, the court referred to the Hell Gate Treaty
which "reserved for the exclusive use and benefit of the tribes
a large tract of land the northern boundary of which bisected Flat-
head Lake ..... 101
It declared, we do not believe the question is one of state
law. . . . [T]he treaty leaves no room for doubt that the
government chose to hold the entire area, submerged lands
no less than uplands, in trust for the Indians rather than for
the future state to be carved out of the region. 0 8
It was argued that the 1887 General Allotment Act subjected
the lands abutting Flathead Lake to the laws of Montana. The
103. United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650, 6653 (9th Cir. 1939).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 654.
106. 127 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1942).
107. 14. at 190.
10. Id. at 191.
PRIOR AND PARAMOUNT WATER RIGHTS
court reviewed the issue in detail, and then quoted the Enabling
Act provision which provides, until Indian title had been extinguished,
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control
of the Congress of the United States. It then added: "So far as
we are advised, the beneficial ownership of the Indians in the bed
and shores of the lake has not been extinguished by the Govern-
ment." 1109 In succinct terms the court in Rochester declared:
It is inadmissible to suppose that the United States having
agreed to hold this area in trust for the exclusive use and
benefit of the Indian tribes, intended to put the tribes at the
mercy of the future state, .... .110
In Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,"" the Supreme Court 'likewise
declared that the United States had ceded to the Indian Nations
there involved the bed of the navigable portion of the Arkansas
River in that jurisdiction. Title to the bed of that navigable stream
and the Indian rights to the use of it vis-a-vis the State of Oklahoma
and those claiming under it, are prime issues in the process of
resolution.
On July 3, 1868, the United States of America entered into a
Treaty between the United States of America and the Eastern Band
of Shoshones and Bannock Tribe of Indians.21 2 By Agreement dated
February 23, 1889, the Shoshone and Bannock Tribes ceded to the
United States a substantial portion of the lands embraced within
the July 3, 1868, Treaty mentioned above. They also agreed to
settle upon the Fort Hall Reservation in the Territory of Idaho."'
Shortly thereafter additional lands were ceded to the United States
by an agreement with the Shoshone and Bannock Tribes. Congress
approved that arrangement on June 6, 1900.114 It provided that Indians
occupying lands within the newly ceded area could continue that
occupancy. Moreover, it provided that the Treaty of 1868 would
continue except as modified.
A conflict arose in Skeem v. United States 15 as to whether
the Indians who retained lands in the ceded areas outside of the
Fort Hall Reservation could continue to enjoy their Winters Doctrine
rights to the use of water although the lands were outside of the
Fort Hall Indian Reservation and in an area subject to the laws
of the State of Idaho. It was contended that the Indian rights to
the use of water were limited to the quantity of water they were
109. Id. at 192.
110. Id.
111. 397 U.S. 620 (1970),
112. 15 Stat. 673.
118. Act of February 23, 1889, ch. 203, 25 Stat, 687.
114. Act of June 6. 1900, ch. 813, 31 Stat. 672.
115. 278 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921).
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using at the: time of the cession of the lands surrounding those
which the Indians retained outside of the Reservation. 11
As in the Winans Decision, 1 7 *involving the off-reservation Yakima
Nation rights of fishery, the court sustained the Winters Doctrine
rights to the use of water claimed by the members of the Shoshone-
Bannock Tribes residing outside of the Fort Hall Reservation. Citing
both Winans and Winters, the Skeem Decision of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals declared that the Tribes reserved--did not grant-
their rights to the use of water by the Treaty of 1868. Although
their allotments were outside of the Reservation within areas gen-
erally subject to State law, the Indians were entitled to exercise
rights to the use of water to cultivate eventually the whole of
their lands so reserved to their use by the Treaty of 1868 and
subsequent agreements, Acts of Congress, or both.118
It will be recalled that the Constitution adopted by the people
of the State of Idaho disclaimed all right and title to Indian lands,
acknowledging absolute jurisdiction and control by the Congress
of the United States over those lands. Skeem is wholly consistent
with that disclaimer and acknowledgment of the immunity of Indian
lands and appurtenances from that invasion of jurisdiction. United
States v. Hibner,11 9 rendered by the United States District Court
of Idaho, involved the same general principles as stated in Skeern
respecting the Winters Doctrine rights to the use of water by Indians
residing outside of the Fort Hall Indian Reservation. Paraphrasing
the Compact between the United States and the State of Idaho,
the court said this:
Going back to the time when Idaho was a territory, and when
the treaty of 1869 was entered into, we find the government
had the power to reserve the waters flowing through the
territories and exempt them from appropriation under the
state laws. 20
Hibner, referring to the unique nature of the Indian lands outside
of the Fort Hall Indian Reservation, the Treaty of 1868, the special
agreements, and Acts of Congress guaranteeing those Indian land
owners rights to the use of water, declared that, as grantee of
the Indian lands, a non-Indian would only "be entitled to a water
right for the actual acreage that was under irrigation at the time
title passed from the Indians ...... 21 After acquisition of Indian
lands the white man becomes subject to the State law. It is re-
116. Id. at 94-95.
117. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
118. Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1921).
119. 27 F.2d 909 (D.C. Idaho 1928).
120. Id. at 911.
121. Id. at 912.
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emphasized, however, that these lands in Hibner are outside of
the Indian Reservation. As ruled in McIntire, the State appropriation
laws respecting rights to the use of water have no application within
the Indian Reservations. 1 22
Irrespective of the broadly based concepts of the immunity of
Indian Winters Doctrine rights to the use of water from state laws,
and those claiming under them, providing for the appropriation
of water rights, the officials of the states have continued to challenge
that immunity. Moreover, literally thousands of non-Indians occupy-
ing lands within Indian Reservations have monopolized the Indian
water resources, claiming rights under state laws to the continuing
irreparable damage to the Indians.
For example, Arizona, in clear violation of the Winters Doctrine,
attempted to limit the Indian rights in the main stream of the
Colorado River. It asserted in Arizona v. California1 23 that Indian
rights were subject to the doctrine of equitable apportionment and
hence the Indian needs would be equated vis-a-vis Arizona needs.
Not so, said the Supreme Court, "even were we to treat an Indian
Reservation like a State, equitable apportionment would still not
control since, under our view, the Indian claims here are governed
by the statutes and Executive Orders creating reservations.' 1 24 Ari-
zona also urged unsuccessfully that the concepts of the Winters
Doctrine were inapplicable after it had achieved statehood. In re-
jecting the state's contentions, the Court pointed to the above re-
viewed Commerce and Property provisos of the Constitution and
said: "We have no doubt about the power of the United States
under these clauses to reserve water rights for its reservations
and its property.' 1 25
In the conflict between the Indian prior and paramount rights
and the state rights, it is essential to observe that the immunity
of Indian rights prevails irrespective of the character of deraignment
of their title to those rights. In Winters the Indians reserved to
themselves-did not grant-their rights to the use of water when
their Reservation was created by Treaty and subsequent Agreement.
Title to Arizona v. California Indian rights is different in its deriva-
tion. There the Reservations were created by Executive Order or
by Congressional Act. 12 6 Thus it was the United States which had
originally extinguished the Indian rights to the use of water and
then restored those rights when the Reservations on the Lower
Colorado River were established. Quite aside, however, from whether
122. United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939).
123. Arizona V. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
124. Id. at 597.
125. Id. at 598.
126. Id. at 596-601.
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the Indians retained to themselves their rights to the use of water,
or whether their rights were once extinguished by the Federal Gov-
ernment and later restored, the concepts of immunity of those rights
from state law remains applicable.
In connection with the Indian rights to the use 4T water in
Arizona v. California, reference is made here to the Enabling Act
for, and the Constitution of Arizona. People of that State, identical
with North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and Washington,
forever disclaimed all right and title to Indian lands as a condition
to Arizona's admission into the Union. They likewise covenanted
that until the title of the Indians to their lands had been extinguished,
Indian land, which includes Indian rights to the use of water, would
remain "under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress
of the United States.1' 1 27 Similar to the five States being principally
considered here, Arizona adopted identical language guaranteeing
immunity from State invasion of Indian lands in its Constitution. 12 8
There was summarized in United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist.129
the precept of the law respecting the immunity from the State
of Washington of Indian rights to the use of water required to
irrigate Yakima Indian lands there involved. In those decisions the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specificially declared:
The rights to the use of that quantity of water was for the
reasons previously indicated originally the exclusive prop-
erty of the United States as trustee for the Indian tribe. No
portion of that volume of water or of the right to use thereof,
was open to appropriation .. . under state law. .... 0
Montana's Mclntire Decision was cited as authority for the prop-
osition enunciated by the court in Ahtanum.5 1 Further, in regard
to the immunity of Indian Winters Doctrine rights to the use of
water from appropriators claiming under State law, the Ahtanum
Decision is authority for the proposition that Indian "[r]ights re-
served by treaties such as this are not subject to appropriation
under state law, nor has the state power to dispose of them.
'1 3 2
IV. STATE CLAIMS
Although the immunity from the States and those claiming under
them, of Indian lands and Winters Doctrine rights to the use of
127. Aluz. Rgv. STAT. ANN. at 81 (1956) ; Enabling Act, June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 20, 36
Stat. 557, 568-579.
128. AriZ. REV. STAT. ANN., ARTz. CONST. art. XX at 573, 574.
129. United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956),; cert. denied,
352 U.S. 988 (1956) ; 330 F.2d 897 (1965) ; 938 F.2d 307, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965).
130. Id. at 340.
131. United States v. MclIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939).
132. United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1956).
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water, has been repeatedly declared by the decisions of the Supreme
Court, the lower courts, by the Congress in the Enabling Acts,
and by the ,Constitutions of the States of North Dakota, South Dakota,
Montana, Idaho, and Washington, the illegal seizure of Indian rights,
allegedly under State 'law, continues. It is one of the greatest trage-
edies affecting the Western Indians today. Hence, it is essential
to consider the basis, if any, in the law which lends validity to
non-Indian claims to Indian rights within the Indian Reservations,
or in water resources which arise off the Reservations but which
supply the Indians. The States of North Dakota, South Dakota, Mon-
tana, Idaho and Washington have complex statutory procedures for
the acquisition, adjudication and administration of rights to the use
of water. At issue is whether those laws can create and invest
in those claiming under them, any color of right to seize Indian
rights to the use of water.
Turning to the laws of North Dakota, that State by statute
declares, subject to noted exceptions not specifically including Indian
rights, that "all waters within the limits of the state . . . belong
to the public. . . ,,'Is Those waters are subject to appropriation
for beneficial use. Rights to the use of water are acquired by
complying with a recently amended series of complex enactments,
rules and regulations adopted by North Dakota.-s
South Dakota has announced that the people of that State have
a paramount interest in the use of all water of the State and
that South Dakota shall determine which waters can be converted
to public use.13 5 That State, moreover, declared "all water within
the state is the property of the people of the state, but the right
to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the manner
provided by law."'' 31 Like North Dakota, the State of South Dakota
has recently adopted far-reaching laws respecting the management
and control by the state of its water resources.13 7
Montana's new Constitution states that all existing rights to
the use of water for any useful or beneficial purposes are recognized
and confirmed. 3 8 This excludes the Indian Winters Doctrine rights
to the use of water for future development. The Constitution provides
that "[a]ll surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters
within the boundaries of the state are the property of the state
for the use of the people. . . ."19 Montana, like other Western
133. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1960).
134. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-01-01.1, to 02 (Supp. 1973), §§ 61-04-02, to 06, 09, 11, 14, 15,
22 (Supp. 1973).
135. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-1-1 (1967).
136. 13 S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-1-3 (1967).
137. See 13 S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-1-2, to 05; § 46-2-1.1 ; § 46-6-3, 6, 6.1, 6.2, 11
(Supp. 1974).
138. 1 MONT. CONST. art. 9, § S.
139. Id.
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States, has adopted far-reaching controls over the waters within the
state1 40 and through recent legislation has implemented the above
mentioned 1972 Constitutional provision respecting water and rights
to the use of water within its jurisdiction. 141 In Anderson v. Spear-
Morgan Livestock Co.'14 2 Montana's Supreme Court declared that
the Crow Indian Treaty of 1868 reserved rights to the use of
water for the Crows and that those waters were not subject to
appropriation by others. 4 3 Hence, as will be subsequently empha-
sized, the State declaration of all waters within the State being
dedicated to the public did not and could not include Indian Winters
Doctrine rights to the use of water.
By its Constitution as originally adopted, the State of Idaho
provided that the right to divert and appropriate rights to the use
of water shall never be denied, except it reserved the right to
regulate water used for power purposes. 14 4 Statutes have been enacted
by Idaho declaring that rights to the use of unappropriated waters
could be acquired only by appropriation in conformity with State
law. 45 Again, as in all other States commented upon, Indian Winters
Doctrine rights are not excepted from that sweeping pronouncement.
When the State of Washington adopted its Constitution it provid-
ed, under the heading of "Public Waters," that "[t]he use of waters
of this state for irrigation, mining, and manufacturing purposes
shall be deemed a public use.' 46 It has been essential to reconcile
that Constitutional claim of Washington to the waters within the State
with its Constitutional "Compact with the United States" forever
disclaiming any right or title to Indian lands, and acknowledging
absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress over those Indian
lands which include rights to the use of water. As stated in Ahtanum
the State of Washington cannot legally issue permits to appropriate
Indian rights to the use of water. 47
In the light of the State Constitutional and statutory claims
that all of the waters belong to the State, or the people of the
State or the public, and the rights to those waters may only
be acquired pursuant to state law, the meaning of those state laws
is most pertinent. The claims of States to the ownership of all waters
within their jurisdiction are not proprietary claims of title to the
rights to the use of water within the State. Rather, they are an
appropriate exercise of the police power of the states to enact
140. See 6 MONT. REV. CODES § 89-865 (Supp. 1973) and MONT. REV. CoDEs pt. 3 § 99-101.1
(Interim Supp. 1974).
141. See MONT. REV. CODES pt. 3, 89-101.1 (Interim Supp. 1974).
142. 107 Mont. 18, 79 P.2d 667 (1938).
143. Id. at 25, 79 P.2d at 669.
144. IDAHO CONsT. art. 15, § 3.
145. See 8 IDAHO CODE § 42-103 (Supp. 1973).
146. WABSH. CONST. art. 21, § 1.
147. 236 F.2d at 828.
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laws for the proper administration and adjudication of waters coming
within their jurisdiction.1 4 8 As will be commented upon, the states
in the exercise of their police power, do not have a veto power
over the proper function of the delegated power of the National
Government under the Constitution, which explicitly includes Indian
affairs. 149
It is most relevant here that the State of Washington, in the
recently tried, yet to be decided, Chamokane Creek Case,50 involving
the Spokane Indian Tribe's Winters Doctrine rights to the use of
water, has by its answers in that case tacitly acknowledged those
Indian rights. It has, nevertheless, asserted jurisdiction within the
Spokane Indian Reservation to issue state permits to appropriate
surplus waters.1 5' There is thus to be tested in the Chamokane
Creek Case the authority of the State of Washington to intrude
upon the Spokane Indian Reservation and to issue permits to non-
Indians.
An important element in that case involving the Winters Doctrine
rights of the Spokane Indian Tribe, relates to absolute control and
jurisdiction of the Congress over that Reservation, as recognized
by the State of Washington in its Enabling Act and Constitution.
When individuals desired to appropriate rights to the use of water
in the Spokane River, of which Chamokane Creek is a tributary,
it was deemed necessary to have explicit Congressional authoriza-
tion. 52 Moreover, in granting permission to appropriate rights pur-
suant to the laws of the State of Washington, the Congress conditioned
that permission upon the consent of the Secretary of the Interior
being first obtained.
In requiring special Congressional authority for non-Indians to
appropriate rights to the use of water within Washington's Spokane
Indian Reservation, there was adherence to a very basic concept
of law. That precept was reviewed in detail by the Attorney General
in regard to the Colville Indian Reservation. Presented there was
the question whether the Secretary of the Interior was correct in
opening for mineral exploration the Colville Reservation under a
general statute on the subject. The Attorney General said that the
Secretary of the Interior was without authority by reason of this
principle of statutory construction: "Concerning Indian reservations,
Indian lands, and Indian affairs generally, Congress habitually acts
148. See Veeder, The Pelton Decision-A Symbol--A Guarantee That the Development and
Conservation of Our Nation's Resources Will Keep Pace with Our National Demands, 27
MONT. L. BEv. 27, 39-40 (1965).
149. See First Iowa Hydro-electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm'n., 328 U.S. 152
(1946).
150. The United States v. Barbara J. Anderson, Civil No. 3643 (E.D, Wash.).
151. Id.
152. See Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1440, 33 Stat. 1006.
153. 34 Op. AT"'Y GEN., 171, 172 (1923-25).
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only by legislation expressly and specifically applicable thereto. ' 153
The reason for the Congressional practice was there stated: "This
is true historically, and the fact is one of necessity, because Indians,
and especially tribal Indians, remain a people apart for whom it
is impracticable to legislate in terms common to them and the
whites."154
It has been declared by the Supreme Court in FPC v. Oregon
15
that Indian rights to the use of water are not within the purview
of the general Congressional Acts of 1866, 1870, and the Desert
Land Act of 1877, which opened to appropriation surplus waters
on the public lands by compliance with state law. 5 In that case
there were involved lands and rights to the use of water reserved
by treaty between the Warm Springs Indians of Oregon and the
United States. Relative to those Indian and Federal lands and rights
to the use of water, the Court declared:
'It is a familiar principle of public land law that statutes
providing generally for disposal of the public domain are
inapplicable to lands which are not unqualifiedly subject to
sale and disposition because they have been appropriated to
some other purpose.' 57
By reason of that fact the laws of the State of Oregon respecting
the appropriation of rights to the use of water on public lands
have no application to Indian Reservations or to lands of the
National Government reserved for its own, and use by the public
generally.1 58
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress has opened Indian Reservation lands for reclamation
development with disastrous results for the Indians whose Reserva-
tions are occupied in part by non-Indians. Yet in keeping with
the need for specific 'legislation to make Indian rights to the use
ofwater available to non-Indians, Congress has in every instance
of non-Indian invasion of Indian rights declared an intention to
that effect. A prime example is Montana's Flathead Indian Reserva-
tion. 5 9 Because of the unique nature of the reclamation projects
on Indian Reservations they are not included in this review of
Indian Prior And Parmount Rights versus State Rights.
There are no Congressionally authorized projects here involved.
154. Id. See also Gibson v. Anderson, 131 F. 39 (9th Cir. 1904) applying that principle to
the Spokane Indian Reservation.
155. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
156. Id. at 446-48.
157. Id. at 448 citing United States v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 501, 510 (1938).
158. See Id. at 448.
159. See generally United States v. Alex,nder, 131 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1942).
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Here the issues present a life or death contest for the Indian Reser-
vations which are being monopolized by non-Indian claimants to
the Reservation based upon State appropriations raising the ques-
tions of (a) whether the Indian Tribes or the Congress have consent-
ed to the violation of the Indian rights and the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Congress; (b) whether the police power of the States may
be extended to the Indian Reservations and seize Indian rights for
non-Indians, or authorize the seizure of them by non-Indians claiming
under those powers. Negative responses must be made to the ques-
tions predicated upon the unbroken line of decisional law, the will
of Congress expressed in the Enabling Acts admitting Western States
into the Union, the Constitutional disclaimers imposed as conditions
to state admission and the overriding Trust obligation of the United
States of America to preserve, protect and assist in the conservation
and use of the Indian tribes' Winters Doctrine rights to the use
of water in the arid and semi-arid West which undoubtedly constitute
the Tribes' most valuable asset beyond their own inherent sovereign
right to govern themselves.
It will undoubtedly be noted that the authorities cited respecting
Indian Winters Doctrine rights to the use of water relate primarily
to Washington, Idaho, and Montana. Climate is the prime reason
for the general lack of competition for water between Indians and
non-Indians in the North Dakota and South Dakota Reservations.
In Eastern Washington, Idaho, and Montana, agriculture cannot be
successfully practiced without water. Hence, the need for more be-
came acute at an earlier date. However, the North and South Dakota
Reservations are now experiencing the need for water not only
for agriculture but for other purposes. Moreover, the seizure of
water by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers
and the proposed diversion of that water away from the Reserva-
tions in the states last mentioned have precipitated a struggle for
water which now is as acute as in Washington, Idaho, and Montana. 160
The primary reason for the violation by the States and those
claiming under them of the Indian rights to the use of water has
been the avidity for water in the Western States and the failure
of the Trustee United States properly to act to prevent those viola-
tions. Political pressure runs strongly against invoking the formid-
able body of law reviewed above which would safeguard the Indian
rights. Hence, history repeats itself and Kent could again lament,
as he did more than a century ago, that the non-Indians surrounding
Indian lands are "penetrated with a perfect contempt of Indian
rights." 161
160. Veeder, Indian Water Rights in the Upper Missouri River Ba~sin, 48 N.D. L. REv. 617,
634 n.90 (1972).
161. 3 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 558 (13 ed. 1884).
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Western Indian Nations and Tribes exercising their inherent sov-
ereign powers of self-government are now adopting their own water
codes. They are proclaiming their title to their rights to the use
of water and declaring that Indians and non-Indians alike may
use Tribal waters only by permit from the Tribes' governing bodies.
If successful, the Tribes exercising their sovereign powers and being
joined in by the awakening conscience of the Trustee United States,
may stop violations and recover their rights which have been il-
legally seized behind the facade of State law and alleged State
jurisdiction.
